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INTRODUCTION
·M.y purpose in writing this thesis has been inspired
largely by the desire for a more familiar aoquaintance with
the practical aspeots of Aristotle's logical works.

For

many years I have had an intimate acquaintance and a great
appreciation of Schopenhauer' s The Art ._.2!_ Cont!o.versy.

The

indication of these two facts to my advisor led to the
suggestion of a comparative study of the two works.
By the very nature of the case, we have confined our
study of Aristotle to the Topics and De So£histicis.Elenchis.
As far as we know there has bee nothing whatever written
the subject of our thesis.

~pon

Hence commentaries and secondary

sources have been of no value, although I have consulted a
nnmber of commentaries on Aristotle's logic.
With a few exceptions which have been indicated, I
have used Edward Poste's translation of De Sophistiois
Elenohis.

Other quoted references have been taken from the

translation by Ross.

Bailey's translation of Schopenaauer's

The Art of

has been used.

C~~troversy

THEIR PURPOSE COMPARED

Schopenhauer's purpose in writing the

Art~

Controversz

is very briefly dealth with and is stated in an incidental
manner.

After defining Dialectic as a science mainly concern-

ed with tabulating and analyzing dishonest stratagems, he
tells us that what follows in his book is to be regarded as a
first attempt to develop a science of Dialectic.

To t1se his

own language_, "I am not aware that anything has been done in
this direction, although I_have made inquiries far and wide.
1.

It is therefore, an uncultivated soil.n
He tells us that his purpose of developing a system of
Dialectio must be accomplished by drawing from experience;
observation of debates arising from intercourse between men;
and by noting the common elements and stratagems employed
in the different forms of disputation.
By

observin~

these, he remarks that "we shall be en-

abled to exhibit certain general stratagems which may be
advantageous as well for our own use as for frustrating
2.
others if they use them."
This is Schopenhauer's statement of his purpose.

It is

merely "to find out the oommon elements and tricks" and
"to exhibit certain general stratagems."

His work consists

in noting and illustrating thirty-eight such dialectical
stratagems.

We shall endeavor later to see how much of an

"unoultivated soiln there was and to observe to what extent

this soil had been onltivated in the writings of Aristotle.
Aristotle's logical works, called the Organon, treat
of a greatvariety of snbjects, tt•ering the whole field of
logic.

Since onr stndy will be based largely on the TO£iea

and the

Soph)~~cis__Elenchis,

of his writing from these.

we shall dednoe the pnrpose
In the opening paragraph of

the Topic a, Aristotle states his purpose:

"Our treatise

proposes to find a line of inqniry whereby we shall be able
to reason from opinions that are generally accepted abont
every problem proponnded to ns, and also shall ourselves,
when standing np to an argnment, avoid sayin& anything that
will obstruct ns.

First, then, we must say what

reason~g

is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical
reasoning; for this is the object of our search in the treatis
3.

before us."
Obviously, a method of reasoning from premisses generally accepted about every problem propounded is broader in
scope than a mere statement of intellectnal frands.

It will

be noted here that Aristotle's purpose was a line of inquiry
which would enable one to reason from opinions that are
generally accepted.

This reasoning from generally accepted

opinions is what Aristotle calls

"dialectical"

reasoning,

in contrast to demonstrative, contentious, or mis-reasoning.
At the beginning of the

SO£histi~is

also gives a statement of his purpose:

Elenehis, Aristotle

"We propose to treat

of sophistical confutation and those seeming confutations which

are not really confutations, but paralogism: and we thus
4.
begin following the natural order of inquiry."
His
natural order of inquiry is as follows:

classification of

reasoning; the branches of sophistry; fallacies dependent
on diction and those not dependent on diction.

After treat-

ing of the above, he tells us of his further purpose:

nwe

have expounded the sources of questions and the mode of
questioning in contentious disputation.

We have now to

discuss answers and solution and the use of this theory."
What follows then is largely a discussion of the solution of
the various fallacies.
Again we can see that Aristotle's stated purpose was
much broader than
gems.

merel~

stating various dialectical strata-

In the conclusion of his work on the fallacies,

.Aristotle reviews his purpose.

Here he tells us that his

aim was the invention of a method of reasoning on any problem
from the most probable premisses.

He explains that that is

the essential task of _Dialectic and pirastic.

But because

sophistry is near to it, a treatise was annexed to enable one
to defend a thesis without self-contradiction.

He further

reviews the fact that in his work he has shown how to arrange
questions and has suggested solutions of fallacies.

Then he

makes a statement that he has also dealt with "other matters
pertaining to this system.n

This, he tells us, was his

"original design. n
If we bear in mind that Schopenhauer's purpose was a

mere statement of the various types of intellectual tricks
without any reference to a particular form of classification
and contrast this with the ambitious aims of Aristotle as
stated above, we can

easi~y

understand that Aristotle's treat-

ment and purpose was far more extensive.

This difference in

their purpose accounts for the fact that much of Aristotle's
treatment of the stratagems is

incidents~.

In fact, as we

shall see· later, many of the stratagems found in Schopenhauer
are stated in .Aristotle as solutions of the fallacy, rather
than an explicit statement of the stratagems.

It is wortny of

note, however, that in the fifteenth chapter of the

Sophistic.~

Elenchis, where Aristotle treats of arrangement and the tactics
of the questioner, there is to be found an explicit statement
of many of the common dialectical frauds.

We shall see that

Schopenhauer takes a number of his suggestions from this
chapter.

A COMPARISON 0~ THEIR DEFINITION ....Q.~ DIALEC~_IC

In discussing the relation of,Schopenhauer's The Art of
Controversy with Aristotle's Dialectic it seems advisable to
consider their definition of the idea of dialectic.

Schopen-

hauer explains that the ancients used logic and dialectic as
synonymous terms, although Aorl/lrtf~,,
consider, to calculate,"

"tofuink over, to

and J:..a.A&ji!cr~""'
1.

are two very different things.

,

"to converse,"

.

Schopenhauer further notes that the name Dialectic was
first used by Plato; and in the Phaedrus,

~ophist,

Republic,

Book VII, and elsewhere we find that by Dialectic he means
the regular employment of the reason, and skill in the
practice of it.

Aristotle also use.s the word in this,; sense,

but according to Laurentius Valla, he was the first to use
Logic too in a similar way.

Dialectic, therefore, seems to be

an older word than Logic.

Cicero and Quintillian used them
2.
with the same signification.
The use of the words Dialectic and Logic as.synonyms
lasted through the Middle Ages until recently.

Kant in

particular used Dialectic in a bad sense as meaning, "the art
of sophistical controversy."

Though the two terms originally

meant the same and since Kant, have again been recognized as
synonymous, Schopenhauer notes that Logic has been preferred
3.

as having the most innocent designation.
He regrets that the ancient use of the word is such
that he is not at liberty to distinguish their meaning.

Other

r"

~----------------------------------------------------------~
wise, ~I should have preferred to define Logic (from Mr~:~s

,

"word" and "reason", which are inseparable) as "the science
of the laws of thought, that is, of the method of reason";
and Dialectic {from JCtl.Air~d"'~..,'

,

"to converse" - and every

conversation communicates either facts or opinions, that is
to say, it is

histo~ical

or deliberative) as "the art of dis4.
putation", in the modern sense of the word.
After stating his own preference as to the meaning of

the words Logic and Dialectic, Schopenhauer states that "logic
deals with a subject of a purely a priori character, separable
in definition from experience, namely the laws of thought,
the process of reason, or the ~~cs; the laws, that is, which
reason follows when it is left to itself and not hindered, as
in the case of solitary thought on the part of a rational
being who is in no

w~y

misled.

Dialectic, on the other hand, (

would treat of the intercourse between two rational beings
who, because they are rational, ought to think in common, but
who, as soon as they cease to agree like two clocks keeping
exactly the same time, create a disputation or intellectual
contest.

Regarded as purely rational beings the individuals

would necessarily be in agreement and their variation spring
from the difference essential to individuality; in other
5.

words, it is drawn from experience."
For him, therefore, Logic as the science of the process
of pure reason should be capable of being constructed a
priori, while Dialectic for the most part, ean be constructed

,'
only a posteriori.

We may learn its rule by experiential

knowledge of the disturbance which r1ure thought suffers
through the difference of individuality manifested in the
intercourse between two rational beings.

We may also learn

rules of Dialectid by acquaintance with the means which disnutants adopt in order to make good against one another their
individual thought, and to show that it is pure and objective.
Schopenhauer prefers to eall that branch of knowledge which
treats of the natural obstinacy of human nature and its
results in reasoning, Dialectic.

But in order to avoid

misunderstanding, he calls it controversial or eristical
Dialectic.

He observes that "eristic is only a harsher name
6.
for the same thing."
Schopenhauer then defines controversial Dialectic as
the art of disputing and in disputing in such a way as to

hold one's own, whether one is in the right or in the wrong.
He illustrates this by noting that na man may be objectively
in the right and nevertheless, in the eyes of the bystanders,
and sometimes in his own, he may come off worst."
the following example:

He gives

"I may advance a proof of some

assertion and my adversary may refute the proof, and thus
appear to have refuted the assertion, for which there may,
nevertheless be other proofs.
adversary and I change places.

In this case, of course, my
He comes off best, although
7.

as a matter of fact, he is in the wrong."
Schopenhauer attributes this to the natural basis of

r

s.
human nature.

"Our innate vanity •••• will not suffer us to

allow that our first position was wrong and our adversary's
ripht •••• With most men innate vanity is accompanied by loquacity and innate dishonesty.

They speak before they think,

and even though they may afterwards perceive that they are
wrong, and that what they assert is false, they want to seem
to the contrary.

The interest of truth •••• now gives way to

the interests of vanity: and so, for the sake of vanity, what
8.

is true must seem false· and what is false must seem true. n
Because of the weakness of our intellect and the

perYe~eity

of our will disputants fight not for truth, but for propositions.
Every man to some extent is armed against int.elleetual
frauds by his own cunning and villainy.

He learns this by

daily experience and by this comes to have his own natural
Dialectic, just as he has his own natural Logic.

But his

Tiialeetic is by no means as safe a guide as his Logic.

Though

false judgments are frequent, false conclusions are rare.

It

is not so easy for one to think or draw inferences contrary
to the laws of Logic.

A man cannot easily be deficient in

natural Logic, though he may very easily be deficient in
natural Dialectic.

Natu.ral Dialectic resembles the faculty

of judgment, which differs in degree with every man, while
reason, is the same.

Thus it happens that in a matter in

which a man is really in the right, he is confounded or
by merely superficial arguments.

refute~

If he does emerge victor-

rr-·----------------------------------------------------------~-·~
iously from a contest it is often owing not so much to the
correctness of his judgment in stating his proposition, as to
the ability with which he defended it.

•

Schopenhauer says,

"Logic is concerned with the mere rorm of propositions;
Dialectic with their contents or matter - in a word, with
their substance."

Again he says, "To form a clear idea of

the province of Dialectic, we must pay no attention to objective truth, which is an affair of Logic; we must regard it
simply as the art of getting the best of it in a dispute ••••
In itself Dialectic has nothing to do but to show how a man
may defend himself against attacks of every kind, and especially against dishonest attacks; and in the same fashion how
he may attack another man's statement without contradicting
himself, or generally without being defeated.

The discovery

of objective truth must be separated from the art of winning
acceptance for propositions; for objective truth is an
entirely different matter: it is the business of sound
judgment, reflection and experience, for which there is no
9.

special art."
Schopenhauer objects to the definition of Dialectic as
"the logic of appearance".

He says in that case it would

only be used to repel false propositions and even when a man
has the right on his side, he needs Dialectic to defend and
maintain it; he must know the dishonest tricks in order to
meet them.

Schopenhauer even adds, "He m~st often make use

of them himself, so as to beat the enemy with his own weapons.•

.I.Vo

r----------------~

<(

He suggests. further that "in a ditt.lectiaal contest we must put
objective truth aside, or rather we must regard it as an
accidental circumstance, and look only to the defense of our
own position and the refutation of our opponent."

And again,

"No respect should be paid to objective truth, because we
10.

usually do not know where the truth lies.n
He further elucidates his notion of Dialectic by stating
"Dialectic then need have nothing to do with truth as little
as the fencing master considers who is in the right when a
dispute leads to a dllel.
business.

Thrust and

parr~r

is the whole

Dialectic is the art of intellectual fencying; and

it is only when we so regard it that we can erect in it a
branch of knowledge.

For if we take purely objeotive truth

as our aim we are reduced to mere Logic; if we take the
maintainence of false propositions it is mere Sophistic; and
in either case it would have to be assumed that we were aware
of what was true and what was false; and it is seldom that
we have any clear idea of the truth beforehand.

The true

conception Qf Dialectic, is then, that which we have formed;
it is the art of intellectual fencing used for the purpose
of getting the best of it in a dispute; and although the
name Eristic would be more suitable, it is more oorreot to
11.

call controversial Dialectic."
The above is Schopenhauer' s definition of Dialectic.
We now turn our attention to the consideration of the manner
in which it was used by Aristotle.
lin

Apparently, Aristotle used

.......
the term . Dialeotic in a broad sense.

It seems that he uses

it in one place in the sense of meaning merely the employment
of reason, or, as the equivalent of Schopenhau.er's definition
of logic.

In another place he appears to u.se it in the sense

of winning approval or assent from others •
.At the beginning of the Topics

Aristotle remarks,

"First then, we mu.st say what reasoning is, and what its
varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical reasoning: for
this is the object of our search in the treatise before us."

12

He then states the varieties of reasoning as being four in
nu.mber:

(1) demonstrative reasoning, {2} dialectical

reasoning, (3) contentious reasoning, and (4) mis-reasonings.
He distingu.ishes them as follows: (1)

"It is a demonstration

when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true
and primary."

{2) Dialectical reasoning is reasoning from

opinions that are generally accepted.

He defines "generally

accepted" as things which are accepted by every one, or by
the majority, or by the philosophers.

(3) Contentious reason-

ing consists in starting from opinions that seem to be
generally accepted, bu.t that are not actually so; or again,
it is contentious reasoning if it merely seems to reason
from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted.
(4) Aristotle observes that in·addition to demonstration,
dialectical and contentic;us reasoning, there are mis-reasonings that start from premisses pecu.liar to the special
sciences.

J.t:::.

These, Aristotle says, may stand for and outline survey
of the species of

reasoning~

He observes, however, that

"the amount of distinction between them may serve, because
it is not our purpose to give the exact definition of any
of them; we merely want to describe them in outline; we
consider it quite enough from the Doint of view of the line
of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them
13.
in some sort of way."
It will be noticed that Aristotle here defines
Diale~tic

accepted.

as reasoning from opinions that are generally
This obviously is not the meaning Schopenhauer

attahced to his use of the word.

.Aristotle's demonstrative

reasoning seems to be comparable to what Schopenahauer prefers to call "logic", which has to do with the form of the
_proposition.

The contentious reasoning of Aristotle

corresponds to Schopenhauer's term, Dialectic.
In Chapter II of the To£ica, Aristotle apparently used
Dialectic in the sense of discovering truth.

"For Dialectic

is a process of criticism wherein iliies the path to the
principles of all inquiries."

It is to this use of the

term Dialectic, that Schopenhauer would differ.

For him,

Dialectic never aids in the discovery of truth, for jrruth
cannot be attained with certainty before the discussion
begins.
In Book I, Chapter XII of the
distinguishes

To~Ac~,

Aristotle

"how many species there are of' dialectical

argtt.ments.~

These he states as being Induction on the one

hand, and Reasoning, on the other.
from individuals to universals."

"Induction is a passage
It is more convincing and

clear and more readily learned by the use of the senses.
Hence it is more applicable to the mass of men.

He says,

however, that Reasoning is more forcible and effective
against contradictious people.

Here again, Aristotle uses

Dialectic in the sense of Schopenhauer's "logic".
Instating the useful elements of Dialectic, Aristotle
enumerates three: "intellectual training, casual encounters,
and the philosophical sciences."

He explains that for

purposes of casual encounter, it is useful because when we
have counted up the opinions held by most people, we shall
meet them on the ground, not of other peoples' convictions,
14.
but of their own.
In this instance, .Aristotle is using
Dialectic in the sense of gaining acceptance for one's
proposition.
In the

Sophist~is

Elenchis

.Aristotle distinguishes

in great detail, Dialectic, from Sophistic, Eristic, ahd
Pirastic proof.

He tells us that npiJi.'astic is a species

of Dialectic, and probes not knowledge but, ignorance and
15.
false pretension of knowledge."
He then gives us a
distinction between a dialectician and a sophist.
dialectician

He is a

"who regards the common principles with their

application to the particular matter 1n hand, whime he who
only appears to do this is a sophist."
el

16.

The sophist

r

---------,
.L':te

.

. . - - - - - - ,

elsewhere .is distingtlished by his motive,

"for the art of

~

sophistry, as we have said, is a kind of art of money-making
17.
from a merely apparent wisdom."
Eristic differs from
So phi sti.c in the sense that the sophists seek financial
reward.

They, both, however, employ the same contentiotls

reasoning, but the master of Eristic aims only at apparent
victory, While the sophist aims at the appearance of wisdom.

18

The important thing to note here is that Aristotle distinguishes the dialectician from the sophist

~on

the basis

that the conclusions of the dialecticians are true in their
form, while those of the sophist only "IYJear"to be so.

This

11se of Dialectic by .Aristotle is quite different from
Schopenhauer's use of it.
Schopenhauer deals with Aristotle's use of Dialectic
and he states explicitly

"Aristotle does not define the

object of Dialectic exactly as I have done."
that Aristotle fails
tion"

"to

dr~w

He observes

a sufficiently sharp distinc-

between Dialectic as dealing with propositions accord-

ing to their truth or merely regarding them according to
their plausibility.

"The rules which he often

~ives

for

Dialectic contain some of those which properly belong to
Logic."

Again he says,

"I am of the opinion, therefore,

that a sharper distinction shotlld be drawn between Dialectic
and Logic than Aristotle has given us; that to Logic we should
assign objective trtlth as far as it is merely formal, and
that Dialectic should be confined to the art of gaining one's

lr'------------------------------------------------------------~~v•

t:

point, and contrarily that sophistic and eristic should not

\

be distinguished from Dialectic in Aristotle's fashion, since
the difference which he draws rests on objective and material
truth; and in regard to what this is we cannot attain any
19.
clear certainty before discussion."
It may help to clarify the matter presented if we give
a brief suron1ary of our findings.

'We have seen that Schopen-

hauer makes a sharp distinction between Logic and Dialectic.
Logic, for him, deals with the laws of thought; it is the
nrocess of reasoning; it is concerned with the form of the
proposition add objective truth.

Dialectic, on the other

hand, is the art of winning acceptance for one's views; it
; is

intellectua~

fencing, experimentally learned and deals

not with the form of a proposition but with the matter or
substance of the proposition.
word

"eristic"

Schopenhauer notes that the

is the same as his use of Dialectic, being

only a harsher term.

He does not prefer to call it

sophistic since that consists in the maintenance of false
propositions and is not acceptable because we can't be
aware of what is or false.
Aristotle uses the term Dialectic in a much broader
sense than merely the art of winning acceptance for a thesis.
He defines it in one place as reasoning from opinions that
are generally accepted.

He suggests, however, that this

definition was not expected to be exact, but merely sufficient
for his present purpose.

El.sewhere, Aristotle suggests that

; ,. 1---------------------------------------------'

1\

~

Induct~on .~nd

Reasoning are

sp~cies

of Dialectic.

indicates that Dialeatic is useful for
philosophiaal sciences.

t~e

Again, he

purpose of the

Here he is using it as equivalent

to Schopenhauer's use of Logic.

Inaddition to the above use

of Dialectic by Aristotle, he seems to use it in the sense
of merely gaining plausible approval.

In other words, for

Aristotle the word is used in a broad sense

wh~ch

would cover

the meaning of what Schopenhauer called Logic and also

......

Dialectic.

......
OF

~m~ASIS

~IALE~TIC

Schopenhauer says that in finding the basis of all
Dialectic we must consider the essential nature of every
dispute.

This he endeavors to do by dividing the modes of

refutation into two parts.
be

~ursued.

There are two courses that may

(1) The modes are (1) ad rem,

or ex concessis.

(2) ad hominem

That is to say: we may show either that the

proposition is not in accordance ·with the nature

o{

i.e., with absolute objective truth; or that it is

things,
inco~-

sistent with other statements or admissions of our opponent,
that is, with truth as it appears to him.
of arguing a

~uestion·produces

The latter mode

only relative conviction, and

makes no difference whatever to the objective truth of the
matter.
(2) The two courses that we may pursue are {1) the direct,
and (2) the indirect.

The direct attacks the reason for

the thesis; the indirect, the results.

The direct

ref~tation

shows that the thesis is not true; the indirect, that

r

~rt

cannot be true.
A two-fold procedure is· possible in pursuing the
direct course.

We may either show that the reasons for the

statement are false

(~~o-

f!1B..J_orem 2_.,.!E_inor~); or we may .admit,

the reasons i'Jr premisses, but show that the. statement does
not follow from them ( nego

conse~uenti~~);

that is, we

attack the conclusion or the form of the syllogism.
The direct refutation makes use either of the diversion

0~

.of the. instance.

(1) The diversion. - We accept our

..

ounonent's
nrouosition as true, and then show what follows
.
.
~~

~

from it when we bring it into connection with some other
proposition acknowledged to be true.

We use the two proposi-

tions as the premisses of a syllogism giving a conclusion whic
is manifestly false, as contradicting either the nature of
things, or other statements of our opponent himself; that is,
the conclusion is false either ad rem or ad hominem.
~uently,

our opponent's

~reposition

Conse-

must have been false; for,

while true premisses can give only a true conclusion, false
rremisses need not always give a false one.
(2) The instance. - or the example of the contrary.

This

consists in refuting the general proposition by direct
reference to particular cases which are included in it in the
way in which it is stated, but to which it does not

a~ply,

and by which it is therefore shown to be necessarily false.

1.

The above is Schopenhauer's framework or skeleton of
all the forms of disputation.

He says that "to this every

kind of controversy may be ultimately reduced."

He allows,

however, that the whole of the controversy may proceed in the
manner described or only appear to do so.

In other words,

it may be supported by genuine or srurious arguments.
Aristotle states substantially the same thing as above
when he enumerates the ways of preventing proof.
four possible ways of preventing a man from
argument to a conclusion.

~orking

"There are
his

It can be done either by demolish

the point on which the falsehood that comes

ab~ut.depends,

or by stating an objection directed against the questioner;
for often when a solution has not as a matter of fact been
brou~ht,

yet the questioner is rendered thereby unable to

pursue the argument any farther.

Thirdly, one may object

to the uquestions asked for it may happen that what the
questioner wants does not follow from the

~uestions

he has

asked because he has asked them badly, whereas if something
additional be granted, the conclusion comes about.

If,

then the questioner be unable to pursue his argument farther,
the objection would

~roperly

be directed against the

questioner; if he can do so, then it would be aginst his
nuestions.

The fourth and worst kind of objection is that

which is directed to the time allowed for disaussion: for
some people bring objections of a kind which would take
longer to answer than the length of the discussicn in hand.
"There are then, as we have said, four ways of making
objections: but of them, the

~irst

alone is a solution:

the others are just hindrances and stumblinb blocks to
•

prevent the conclusions."

2.

We may note that the purpose of Aristotle here is not
perfectly parallel with Schopenhauer's discussion of the
essential nature of every dispute.
fact that Aristotle suggests in this

There is, however, the
~lace

that one of the

modes of refuting an argument is to show that the proposition is not in accordance with the nature of things, or in

other words, attaokihg the premise, "BY demolishing the point
on which the falsehood that comes about depends."
translates this phrase,

"The repudiation of

A

Paste

false premise.

This we say, is a parallel to what Schopenhauer calls "the
direct refutation (which) shows that the thesis is not true."
'
Notice that .Aristotle himself observes
"there are then,

as we have said, four ways of making objection: but of them
the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances
and stumbling blocks to prevent the conclusion. rr

These

stumbling blocks and hindrances might roughly correspond
to Sohopenhauer's indireot method of refutation.
~rn

the

Sophi~t.i2_is El,!3_~his

the method of disputation.

Aristotle also gives us

"As solution is either addressed

to the proof, or the prover and his questions, or to neither;
so questions and proof may be addressed either to the thesis,

.

the answerer, or the time, when the solution requires more
time than is allowed, or the

~uestioner

has time for a

3.

re ,ioinder."
Here again we find latent in Aristotle that which
Schopenhauer has elaborated as the basis of Dialectic.
Aristotle speaks of a solution as being
~roof",

Vlhen

"addressed to the

this is what Schopenhauer calls the direct mode of

refutation.

Likewise when Aristotle speaks of addressing

the solution

"to the prover" he approximates Schopenhauer's

indirect mode of refutation.
Elsewhere in the

So£histi~i

Elenchi Aristotle gives

u.s in .subs,t 8noe wh,at SohopenhaueD laid dovm as the basis of
Dialeotic.

He is enumerating the objeots aimed at when dis-

.

putants are "contentious and fight for victory."
five objects:

..naradox,

"to confute the

oppon~nt,

He lays down

to drive him into

to reduce him to solecism, and to reduce him to pleo-

nasm, that is, to superfluous repetition: or the semblance of
4.

any one of these achievements without the reality."
Aristotle then adds,

"The end most desired is to confute the

answerer, the next to Phow that he holds a false opinion, the
third to lead him into paradox, the fourth to land him into
solecism, that is, to show that his expression involves a
violation of the laws of grammar, the fifth to foroe him to
5.

unmeaning repetition."
Again we note that Aristotle proposes the direct method
of refutation:
indireot:
~uite

"Show that he holds false opinion";

"To lead him to paradox."

and the

Later Aristotle devotes

a long chapter to.the methods of refutation by bringing

one into paradox.

One of the suggested methods is an

exoellent example of what Schopenhauer calls the diversion,
which he explains as accepting our opponent's proposition as
true and then show what followsfrom it when we bring it with
connection with some other propasition acknowledged to be
true.

Aristotle states this paradox as follows:

"Paradox

may be elicited by considering to what school the respondent
belongs, snd proposing some tenet of' the school that the
world pronounces to be a paradox; for there are such tenets

in every sahool.

For this puxpose it is

a oolleation of paradoxes.

~aeful

to hsve made

The proper solution is to show

that the paradox has no eonneation with the thesis, as the
6.

disputant pretends. n
We may aonclude by calling attention to the fact that
though

Saho~enhauer

does not follow Aristotle in so many

words when he gives his basis of Dialectic, yet as we have
endeavored to show, Aristotle has in substance what Schopenhauer sets forth in a very lucia manner, that the essential
nature of every dispute may be reduced to two modes of
refutation, that is, by showing that the proposition is not
according to the nature of things, or that it is inconsistent with other statements or admissions of our opponent.
The following schema may help to clarify the matter:
Schopenhauer, we may note, proposes a framework or skeleton
of all forms of disputation to which every kind of controversy may ultimately be reduced.

This, he aalls, "The

essential ,nature of every dispute"

or

"the basis of all

dialectic."
Sohopenhauer says that there are two modes of
refuting a thesis and two courses that may be pursued.

I

Two Modes

1.

ad~

(proposition not objectively true

2. ad hominem

direct
II

Two Couxses

(inconsistent with admissions of opponent).

1. diversion
2. instance

indirect

23.
Two-fold procedure of the direct course:
ad rem
1. Diversion
ad hominem
2. Instance

(refuting a universal by citing a
particular example)

Aristotle has no su•h framework.

He does not ex-

plicitly deal with the basis of all Dialectic.

Hence one is

forced to find some basis of similarity in the incidental
remarks of Aristotle.

This we have endeavored to do, not

by drawing an exact parallel, but by showing that Schopenhauer reduces the basis of Dialectic to two modes ot retutation which are the direct or ad

~'

and indirect or ad

hominem; and that Aristotle does the same.

He expresses

the direct method as showing that the oppoent

"holds a

false opinion", and the indirect method by leading an
o9ponent into what he calls "paradox."

In other words,

both Sahopenhauer and Aristotle agree that refutation consists in showing that propositions are contrary to the
nature of things or inconsistent with other

statem~nts

or

admissions of one's opponent.

l

l------______.

.......
AN . .INTRODUCTIO:T.J~.Q.. THEIR DIALECTICAL STI:ATAGEMS

The term DIALECTICAL STRATAGEMS is the term that Sohopenha~er

uses to describe the thirty-eight fraudulent tricks

which can be_used to get the best of it in a dispute.
Aristotle does not in so many words use the term DIALECTICAL
STRATAGEHS, he does, however, speak of "eristic confutation,"
which is not ngenuine but only apparent".

And again he speaks

of enumerating "the sources of paralogism and frauds of, the
questioner~"

In order to form an adequate

compar~son o~

what we

shall call their Dialectical Stratagems it will be necessary
to outline their procedure.

Sohopenha~er,

with the exception

of two introductory chapters, devotes the entirety of his
Trlli ART OF CONTROVERSY to a statement of the various stratagems.

These are nrunbered from one to thirty-eight, and are

apparently given in no specific

seq~ence.

Aristotle, on the contrary, has a very
arrangement in his Sonhistic :Jlenchis.
.tells

~s

system~tic

His opening_paragraph

nwe propose to treat of sophistical confutations

and those seeming confutations which are not really confuta1.

tions, but paralogisms;"
natural order of inquiry."

and we thus begin, following the
2.

As we have already indicated,

our attempted comparison of the

Art~!

Controversl with the

Dialectic of Aristotle must of necessity make almost
exclusive use of the

?2~~~ticis

Elenchis, for it is here that

~D.

treats the logioal fallaoies.
In this work Aristotle lived up to his purpose in follow"the natural order of inquiry."
to four parts:

wo~k

may be divided in

(1) Introduction, oh. 1-2, (2) Perpetration

of Fallacies, eh. 3-15,
(4)

The

(3) Solution of Fallacies, ch. 16-32,

Epilogue, ch. 34.
In the Introduction Aristotle expatiates on the distinc-

tion of genuine from merely apparent reasoning and confutation.

"So proof and confutation are either real or only seem

to be such to the inexperienced •••••• Proof is a tissue of
propositions, so related that we of necessity assert some
(;

ftlrther pro,position as a conseqtlence.

Confutation is a

proof whose conclusion is the contradictory of a given
3.

thesis.",
He tells us "it answers the purpose of some persons
rather to seem to be philosophers and not to be, than to be
and not to seem; for Sophistry is seeming but unreal philosophy, and the sophist is a person who makes money by the
semblance of philosophy without the reality; and for his
success it is requisite to seem, to perform the f'unct ion of
the philosopher without performing it, rather than to per4.
form it without seeming to do so.•
He says further
that

"those who wish to practice as Sophists

5.

will aim

at the kind of reasonings we have described, for it
suits their purpose, as the faculty of thus reasoning

produces a semblance of philosophy, which is the
6.
they propose."

end

At the end of this ehapter he tells us what he expects
to do in the following chapters of the book.

"The various

kinds of sophistical reasoning, the branches of a sophistical
faculty, the various elements of the sophistical profession,
and other components of the art remain to be examined."

7.

In the next cha:pter he distinquishes reasoning into four
orders: Didactic, Dialectic, Paristic, and Eristic.

After

this he enumerates the five ob(jects aimed at VJhen disputants
"are contentious and fight for victory."

In the fourth

chapter he observes that "seeming confutations fall Qnder
two divisions: those where the semblance depends on language,
and those where it is independent of language."

Here he

enumerates the fallacies dependent on diction, which are
six in number.

"The ambiguity of a term, ambiguity of a

proposition, the possibility of wrong disjunction, the
possibility of wrtong conjunction, the possibility of wrong
8.
accentuation, the similarity of termination."
After
illustration the use of these, he discusses the seven
fallacies that are not dependent on diction.

They arise

from "the equation of subjects and accidents; from the
confusion of an absolute statement with a statement limited
in manner, place, time or relation; from an inadequate
notion of confutation; from a conversion of consequent and

<.;I

e

from begging the rJ.uestion; from taking what is
for a aause; and lastly, from putting many questio
After illustration the above

by

examples of each,

observes "for all the fallacies we enumerated may be resolved
into offenses against the definition of confutation; for
either the reasonings are inconclusive; whereas the premisses
ought to involve the conclusion, of n-eessity and not merely
$'-'

appearance, or they fail to· satisfy the remaining elements
10.
the definition."
In the next chapter he notes that *11 the fallacies

ar~se

confusion and must be solved by drawing proper dist.inc"In all these the minuteness of the difference
the deception, for it makes us fail to entirely
11.
the definition of proposition and proof.•
From
here he endeavors to draw the difference between paralogism
~nd

sophistic proof.

4isti~ction

Then follows a long discussion of the

between Sophistic, and Eristic, Sophistic and

Psuedographic, Scientific and Pirastic proof.

Following

this he tells us how to show the various fallacies, how
into paradoxes, how to reduce to tautology or
Then he discusses the different methods of
an argument so as to conceal on:e! s }1Urpose.

It

is in this chapter that we will find many parallels in
hopenhauer.
In the third section

&~

the treatise he discusses the

lutions to various fallacies.

He ditides them into those

dependent .on diation, which are ·all)bigU:ity and amphiboly;
ambiguous division and aombination of words; wrong aoaent;
like expressions for different things.

The other division,

those not depending on diction, are aoaident; use of words
with or without qualifiaation; ignoratio enelahi; petitio
principii; the eonse1uent; false cause; many questions.
Thus we have tried to state briefly a comparison of
Sohopenhauer's and Aristotle's plan of procedure as a
background for a more detailed comparison of their Dialectical
stratagems.

I

The first dialectical stratagem

ot Sahopenhauer is the

extension or exag@eration ot a proposition beyond its natural
limits.
•This consists in carrying your opponent's
proposition beyond its natural limits; in giving
it as general a signification and as wide a sense as
possible, so as to exaggerate it; and, on the other
hand, in giving your own proposition as restricted
a sense and as narrow limits as you can because
the more general a statement beeomes, the more
numerous are the obJections to which it is open.
The defence consists in an accurate statement of the
point or essential question at issue." 1.
The statement of this stratagem is not explicitly found
.,
.

:

,..., ..L
'

I

in Aristotle.
~uestioner
~Y

He does, however, suggest that

"~ometimes

the

must attack a propositlon different from the thesis

means of misinterpretation if he cannot attack the

2
th~sts."

He also warns us that "fallacies that omit some element in
the definition ••.• must be solved by examining whethe.r. :1;he
conclusion is contradictory to the thesis, and regards the
same terms in the same portion, in the same relation, in the
3.

same mam1er, and in the same time."
II

Sohopenhauer's second stratagem is to extend a proposi-

r
'

I

t;

f·

tion beyond its natural meaning and then refute the extended
proposition.

It is a soDhism based on homonymy.

t
"This trick is to extend a proposition to
~----s-om_e_t_h_i_n_g_w_h_i_c_h_h_a_s~l!!!".'i"!!'t_t_l_e_o_r_n_o_t_h_i_n_g_i_n_o_o_mm_o_n______~

with the matter in question but the similarity of
the word·s; then to re:t'llte it trillmphantly, and so
claim oredit for having refllted the original statement •••• This triok may be regarded as identical
with the sophism ex homo~ia; it is a confusion of
essentially differen~things-through the homonymy
in a word and hence is an alteration of the point in
dispute." 4.
Aristotle, in Chapter XIX deals with the fallacies
based on homonymia and amphibolia,

Here he observes that

"when there is an ambiguity in a term or prorosition of
a confutation, the ambiguity sometimes lies in the premisses,
sometimes in the conclusion ••• When the ambigllity lies in
the conclusion, llnless the conalllsion is ;)re1;iously denied
by the respondent, there is no confutation •••. for confutation
5 •.

requires contradiction."

He suggests .that "the thesis

should at starting, be stated with a 41atinction, if it conta
any ambiguity."

He speaks of the ambiguous proposition as

being "true in the

answerer~s

sense, false in the opponent's."

He further notes that "there is a distinction ·between a
restricted and unrestricted premiss.

If a questi?ner argues

with regard to the distinction, we must contend that he
has contradicted the name, not the reality, and therefore
6.

has not confuted."
III
Sohopenhauer's third trick is very similar to the
first two, and the above references to Aristotle apply to
it.

~Another triak is to take a proposition which
is laid down relatively, and inref'erenoe to some
particular matter, as though it were uttered with a
general or absolute application; or, at least to
take it in some quite different· sense, and then
refute it." 'l.

As Sohopenhauer notes, Aristotle suggests an example
of this trick which is as follows:

"A Moor is blaok; but

in regard to his teeth he is white; therefore, he is black
8.

and not black at the same moment."
IV

This stratagem of Schopenhauer is to refuse to admit
true premisses because of a foreseen conclusion.
"If you want to draw a conclusion, you must not
let it be foreseen, but you must get the premisses admitte
one by one, unobserved, mingling them here and there in
your talk; otherwise, your opponent will attempt all
sorts of chieanery. Or, if it is clollbtful whether
your opponent will admit them, you must advance the
premisses of these premisses; that is to say, you
must dfaw up pro-syllogisms, and get theu premisses
of several of them admitted in no definite order.
In this you conceal your game until you have obtained all the admissions that are necessary, and
so reach your goal by making a circuit. These
rules are gi.ven by Aristotle in his Tt,P.ica 8:1 •
. It is a trick which needs no ill1:1stra fori':-" 9.
It will be noted that Schopenhauer points out that the
rules of these tricks are to be found in the Topics 8:1.

In

this chapter, Aristotle suggests that the use of premisses
"to conceal the conclusion serve a controversial purpose only;
but inasmuch as an undertaking of this sort is always conduct·
ed against another peason, we are obliged to employ them as

10.
well."
Aristotle further tells us that "concealment of ane's
plan is obtaihed by securing through pro-syllogisms the

.nremisses

through
which the proof of the original proposition
-

is to be constructed

and as many of them as possible.

This is likely to be effected by making syllogisms to prove
not only the necessary premisses, but also some of those
11.
which are required to establish them."

v
In number five Schopenhauer· suggests the use of the
argument ex concessis.
"To prove the truth of a proposition, you
may also employ previous propositions that a~e
not true, should your opponent refuse to admit
the true ones, either because he fails to perceive their truth, or because he sees that the
thesis immediately follows from them. In that
case the plan is to take propositions which
are false in· themselves but true for your
opponent, and argue from the way in which he
thinks, that is to say, ex concessis. For a
true conclusion may follow from false premisses, but not vice versa. In the same fashion
your opponent's false propositions, which,
however, takes to be true; for it is with
him that you have to do, and you must use
the th~ughts that he uses. For instance, if he is a member of some sect to which you do
not belong, you may employ the declared
opinions of this sect against him, as
principles." 12.
Aristotle approaches this trick in his discussion of
paradox.

"Paradox may be elicited by considering to what

school tae respondent belongs, and »roposing some tenets of

oc.

13.

the school that the world pronounces to be a paradox."

VI
In this Sahopenhauer uses the plan of begging the
question.
"Another plan is to beg the question in
disguise by postulation vvhet has to be proved,
either (1) under another name; for instance,
ngood repute" instead of "honor"; ''virtue"
instead of "virginity", eta; or by using such
convertible terms as "red-llooded animals't
end "vertebrates"; or (2) by making a
general assumption covering the particular
point in dsipute; for instance, maintaining the uncertainty of medicine by postulation of the uncertainty of all human knowledge. (3) If, vice versa, two things
follow one from the other, and one is to
be proved, you may postulate the other.
!4) If a general proposition is to be
proved, you may get your opponent to admit every one of the particulars. This
is the converse of the second." 14.
Aristotle suggests five weys in which people appear to
beg the original question.
FThe first and most obvious being if
amy one begs the actual point, reQuiring to be
shown: this is easily detected when put in
so many words; but it is more apt to escape
detection in the case of different terms,
or a term and an expression that mean the
same thing. A second way occurs whenever
any one begs universally something which
he has to demonstrate in a particular case:
suppose (e.g.) he were trying to prove that
the knowledge of contraries is one and were
to claim that the knowledge of opposites
in general is one: for then he is generally
thought to be begcing, along with a number
of other things, that which he ought to have
shown by itself. A third way is, if any one
wer~ t6 beg in particular oases what he
und~rtakes to show universally: e.g. if he

V'Z

undertook to show that the knowledge of con. traries is always one, and begged it of
certain pai~s of contraries: for he also
is generally considered to be begging independently and by itself, what, together
with a number of other things, he ought
to have shown. Again, a man begs the
question if he begs his conclusion piecemeal; supposing e.g. that he had to show
that medicine is a science of what leads to
health and to disease, and were to claim
first the one, then the other; or, fifthly,
if he were to beg the one or the other of
a pair of statements that necessarily involve one another; e.g. if he had to show
that the diagonal is incommensurable with
the side, and were to beg that the side is
incommensurable with the diagonal." 15.
In chapter 27 of the

Sophi~tici__Ele~~-~'

Aristotle dis-

cusses the solution of the fallacy of begging the question.
In this place he suggests the following:

"In fallacies from

begging and assuming the point in issue, if we are aware in
time we should deny the proposition, even though it be
probable, and say, as we fairly may, that it cannot be granted
but must be proved."
VII

This stratagem is the use of the erotematic or socratic
method of asking many questions and then concealing the
intended conclusion.
nsao~ld the disputation be conducted on
somewhat striot and formal lines, and there be
a desire to arrive at a very clear understanding, he who states the proposition and wants
to prove it may proceed against his opponent
by question, in order to show the truth of the
statement his admissions. This erotematic,
or Socratic method was especially in use among
! ~----------------------------------------~----------------~
L

o

c

the ancients; and this and some of the following
are akin to it. The plan is to ask a great many
widereaching questions at once, so as to hide what
you want to get admitted, and on the.other hand,
quickly nropound the argument result~ng from the
admissions· for those who are slow of understanding cannot'follow accurately, and do not notice
any.mistakes or gaps there may be in the demonstration." 16.
Aristotle treats of the rules for concealment in the
Topics, Book 8, Chapter 1, to which we have already referred.

-

In the _......;;...;._
De Sonhistiois Elenohis he tells us that "for a conoealment of his purpose arrangement is important to the
sophist as to the dialectician."

He observes that "length

is favorable to concealment; for it is hard to see the
mutual relations of a long series of propositions •••• ~uick
ness facilitates concealment for the answerer has not time
17.
to forsee consequences."
VIII

Here Schopenhauer suggests using the trick of making
the ODponent angry.
"This trick consists in making your
opponent angry; for when he is angry he is
incapable of judging aright, and perceiving
where his advantage lies. You can make him
angry by doing him repeated injustice, or
practising some kind of chicanery, and being
generally insolent.n 18.
Aristotle has a very similar suggestion which he states
as follows:

[,

[

1:

~

"So too, anger and the heat of dispute
for any mental discomfiture, puts us off guard.
Anger may be produced by effrontery and open

l----a-t_t_e_m_p_t_s_t_o_c_h_e_a_t_._·"-_1_9_·----------------...J

vv•

IX

In number nine, Schopenhauer suggests transposing
q_uestions in order to maac

procedure~

"Or you may _put q_u. e st ions in an order
different from that which the conclusion to
be drawn from them requires, and transpose them,
so as not to let hi!" know at what you are aiming.
He can then take no precautions. You may also
use his answers for different or even opposite
conclusions, according to their character.
This is akin to the trick of masking your
procedure. n 20.
Aristotle suggests the use of the trick of 'masking the
procedure in a number of

In

~laces.

he snggests the following method:

To~ics,

Chapter !, Book I,

"Moreover do not state the

conclusions of these premisses, but draw them later one after
another; for this is likel,y to keep the answerer at the greatest possible distance from the original proposition.
in:;: generally,

g

SpeAk-

man who desires to g-et information by a

concealed method should so put his question thBt when he has
put his whole argument and has stated the eonclllsion, people
still ask, 'Well, but why is that?' "/
In the Sonhistic , Elenchi

.Aristotle deals with the

problem of masking procedure in his discussion of how to
reduce the questioner to fa.lse or paradoxical statement.

He

says that false or paradoxical ·statement is obtained by
qllestioning withollt previolls definition of the problem.
says,

He

"Random answers are more likely to be wrong and answers

are made at random when there is no point at issue •••• It is
useful to multiply

~uestions •••• to

lead him on to controversial

l)'l.

21.
X

This stratagem consists of asking the converse of what
actually wants to have admitted.
nrf you observe that your O,Pponent designedly
returns a negative answer to the questions which,
for the sake of your ,Proposition, you want him to
answer in the affirmative, you must ask the
converse of the proposition, as though it were
that which you were anxious to see affiri;;ed; or,
at any rate, you may give him his choice of both,
so that he may not perceive which of them you
are asking him to affirm." 22.
Aristotle has a very parallel suggestion and states it
in the following manner:
"If one desires to secure an admission that
the knowledge of contraries was one, one should
ask him to admit it not of contraries but of
opposites: for if he grants this, one will then
argue that the knowledge of contraries is also
the same, seeing that contraries are opposites.
If he does not, one should secure the admission
by induction, by formulating a proposition to
that effect in the case of some particular
pair of contraries. For one must secure necessary premisses either by reasoning or by
induction, or else partly by one and partly
by another. 11 23.
XI

Schopenhall.er here sugBests the assumption of general
truths from the admission of particular cases.
"If you make an indll.ction, and yoll.r opponent
grants you the .Particular cases by which it is to
be supported, you must refrain from asking him if
he also admits the general trll.th which issues from
the particll.lars, but introde it afterwards as a
settled fact; for, in the meanwhile, he will himself come to believe that he has admitted it, and
the same impression will be received by the audience, because they will remember the many
questions as to the particulars, and suppose that

vu

24.

they must, of course, have attained their end."
We find the suggestion of this same stratagem in
Aristotle.

He says, "Often when the particulars of an

induction are granted the universal should not be asked but
employed as if granted, for the answerer will fancy he has
granted it and so will the audience, as they will recollect
the induction and assume the particulars were not asked
25.

without a purpose."
XII
Stratagem number twelve suggests the use of suggestive
metaphor favorable to one's position, or the use of questionbegging epithets.
"If the conversation turns upon some
general conception which has no particular
name, but requires some figurative or metaphorical designation, you must begin by
choosing a metahpor that is favorable to
your proposition. For instance, the names
used to denote the'two political parties,
in Spain, Serviles and Leberals are obviously chosen by the latter. The name Protestants is chosen by themselves, and also the
name Evangelicals; but the Catholics call
them heretics. Similarly, in regard to
the names of things which admit of a
more exact and definite meaning: for example, if your opponent proposes an alteration, you can call it an innovation, as
this is an invidious word,"etc. 26.
The writer has been unsuccessful in finding this stratagem stated explicitly in Aristotle.

It is, of course, a very

evident trick that is used almost instinctively.

Aristotle's

treatment of Figura Dictionis makes it plain that "we must
solve fallacies from similarity of expression by pointing out

the

diffe~e~ce_of

is not a

category denoted by similar words."

suggestio~

This

of the use of the question-begginp, epithet,

but all fallacies based on figures have at the bottom a
subtle petitio principii.
XIII
Number thirteen aonsists of :forcing the opponent to
choose between two propositions which are glaringly contrasted
"To make your opponent accept a proposition, you must give him the counter-proposition
as well, leaving him his choice of the two;
and you must render the contrast as glaring as
you can, so ~hat to avoid being paradoxical he
will accept the proposition, which is thus made
to look QUite probable. For instance, if you
want to make him admit that a body must do
everything that his father tells him to do,
~sk him "whether in all things we must obey
or disobey our parents". Or, if a thing is
said to occur "often, 11 ask whether by "often"
you are to understand few or many cases; and
he will say "manyn. It is as though you were
to put grey next black, and call it white;
or next white, and call it black." 27.
This is expressly found in Aristotle.
"To obtain a proposition you should contrast it with the opposite. If for instance,
you want to obtain the premise, that a man
should obey his father in all things, you
should ask, Should a man obey or disobey his
parents in all things; and if you want the
premise that a. small number multiplied by
a small number is a large number, you should
ask whether it is a small number or a large
number; for if compelledto elect, one would
rather pronounce it a large number. For the
juxtaposition of oontraries increases their
apparent quantity and value.n 28.
XIV
This sophism is the advancing in a tone of'
conclusion as though it had been proved.

tri~ph

the

..
"This, which is an impudent trick, is
played as follows: when your opponent has
answered several of your questions without
the answers turning out favorable to the conelusion at which you are aiming, advance the
dasired conclusion, - although it does not
in the least follow, - as though it had been
proved, and proclaim it in a tone of triumph.
If your opponent is shy or stupid, and your
yourself possess a great deRl of impudence
and a good voice, the trick may easily
succeed. It is akin to the fallacy non
causae ut causae." 29.
This trick is al3o to be fow1d in Aristotle.
Stated by him in the following language:

It is

"An appearance of

confutation is often produced by a sophistic fraud, when the
questioner without having proved anything, instead of asking
~he

final proposition, asserts it in the form of a conclu-

sion, as if he had disproved the thesis." 30.

In number fifteen Schopenhauer suggests the impudent
trick of submitting a proposition so as to cause the opponent
to suspect a trick, and then trying to reduce him to absurdity.
"If you have advanced a paradoxical
proposition and find a difficulty in proving
it, you mAy submit for your opponent's acceptance or rejection some true proposition, the
truth of which, however, is not quite palpable, as though you wished to draw your
proof from it. Should he reject it bec~use
he suspects a trick, you can obtain your
triumph by showing hovJ absurd he is; should
he accept it, you have got reason on your
side for the moment, and must now look about
you; or el~e you can employ the previous trick
as well, and maintain that your paradox is
proved by the proposition which he has
accepted. For this an extreme degree of

=. impudence is re ~ uired; but exper ienoe shows
oases of it, and there are people who
practice it by instinct." 31.
Aristotle seems to have the same stratagem in mind
when he writes as follows:
"It is so9histic, too, when the thesis
is a paradox to ask in proposing the premisses for the respondent's genuine opinion,
as if the thesis was his genuine opinion,
and to put all the questions in this shape:
it is your real opinion, etc., if the
question is a premiss of the proof, the
answerer must either be confuted or led
into paradox; if he grants the premiss,
he must be confuted; if he says it is not
his real opinion, he utters a paradox, if
he refuses to granted the premiss, though
he allows it to be his opinion, it looks
as if he were confuted." 32.

XVI
Here Sohopenhauer suggests the use of arguments ad
hominem or ex

concessis~

"Another trick is to use arguments
ad hominem or ex concessis. When your
opponent makes a proposition, you must
try to see whether it is not in some way
--if needs be, only a~parently--inconsist
ent with some other proposition which he
has made or admitted, or with the principles of a school or sect which he has
commended and approved, or with the
actions of those who support the seot,
or else of those who give it only an
apparent and spurious support, or his
own actions or want of act ion. For e·xample, should he defend suicide, you may
at once exclaim, "Why don't you hang,yourself?" Should he maintain that Berlin is
an unpleasant place to live in, you may
say, "Why don't you leave by the first
train?" Some such claptrap is always
possible." 33~

_Ari~totle

gem.

also suggests the use of this_ type of strata-

nniscre_pancies should be developed between the thesis

and the tenets either of the answerer or of those whome he
acknowledges to be high authorities, or of those who are
generally so acknowledged, or of those of his own school,
or of those of the majority of people, or of those of all
34.

mankind.rr
XVII
This trick consists in saving the day by advancing
some subtle distinction.
"If your opponent presses you with a
counter-proof you will often be able to save
yourself by advancing some subtle distinction, which, it is true, had not previously occurred to you; that is, if the matter
admits of a double application, or of being
taken in any ambiguous sense." 35.
Aristotle states the same thing by saying, "And as the
answerer avoids immediate confutation by drawing distinctions,
so the questioner who forsees an obJection that applies in
one sense and not in another, should explain that he means
36.

the proposition in the unobjectionable sense."
XVIII
Here Schopenhauer indicates how to save oneself from
defeat by digressing from the point at issue.
"If you observe that your opponent has taken
up a line of argument which will end in your
defeat, you must not allow him to carry it to
its conclusion, but interrupt the course of
the dispute in time, or break it off alto-

. get her, .or lead him away from the subject,
. and bring him to others. In short, you
must effect the trick which will be noticed
lat~r on, the mutatio controversiae." 37.
This tridk is suggested by Schopenhauer in several of
his stratagems: number twenty-nine, nineteen, twenty-six, and
thirty-four.
Aristotle makes the same observation.

In speaking of

those who are in the process of being confuted,
he suggests,
\
"They should also break off their argument and cut down their
other lines of attack •••• one should also lead attacks some38.

times against positions other than the ones stated."

XIX
This is another type of stratagem based on changing the
:s.ubjeet.
"Should your opponent expressly challenge
you to produce any objection to some definite
point in his argument, and you have nothing
much to say, you must try to give the matter
a general turn, and then talk against~ that.
If you are called upon to say why a particular physical pypothesis cannot be accepted,
you may speak of the fallibility of human
knowledge, and give v~rious illustrations
of it." 39.
I have been unable to find this stratagem explicitly
stated in Aristotle.

There is a similarity in one element,

that is, giving the matter a general turn.

He warns that any

ndigressing from the argument in hand" should be anticipated
and one must "restrict the bearing" to the subject under
40.

discussion.

44 •
.XX

This trick is an application of the fallacy non causae
ut causae.
"When you have elicited all yo11r premisses,
and your opponent has admitted them, you must
refrain from asking him for the conclusion, but
draw it at once for yourself; nay, even though
one or other of the premisses should be lacking,
you may take it as though it too had been admitted, and draw the conclusion. This trick
is an ap~lication of the fallacy non causae
ut causae." 41.
Aristotle tells us that an appearance of confutation is
often produced by a sophistic fraud

"when the Questioner

without having proved anytmmng, instead of asking the final
proposition, asserts it in the form of a conclusion as if he
42.

had disproved the thesis."
In discussing the fallacy non causa pro causa, he suggest
the foll,qwing as a solution:
"In fallacies where a superfluous proposition
is foisted in as the cause of an absurd conclusion, we must examine whether the suppression
of the premiss would interrupt the conclusion;
and after showing that it does hot, we may add
that the premisses which really cause it were
not granted because they were believed, but
because the r1uestioner seemed to wish to use
them against the thesis, which he has failed
to do." 43.

XXI
Here Schopenhauer suggests the meeting of superficial
Arguments by counter arguments
11

e~ually

superficial.

When your opponent uses a merely superficial
or sophistical argument and you see through it,
you can, it is true, refute it by setting forth
its ca ious and s

is better to meet him with a counter-argument whi~h is just as superficial and s6phistioal, and so dispose of' him; for it is
with vi~tory you are concerned, and not
with truth~" 44.
The writer has been unable to find any parallel
to this st:ratagem in the writings of .Aristotle.

In f'act, it

arrears to me that Sohopenhauer's suggestion isn't wise
strategy.

In my opinion it would be much better to note the

oa:Dtious and superficial natt1re of the opponent's argument
rather than to lower one's intellectual dignity by resorting
to the same superficial reasoning.
XX.! I

In number twenty-two it is pointed out that one can
avoid admitting something prejudicial to his interest by
declaring it a petitio

princip~i.

"If your opponent requires you to admit
something from which the point in dispute
will immediately follow, you must refuse to
do so, declaring that it is a petitio principii. For he and the audience will regard
a proposition which is near akin to the
point in dispute as identical with it, and
in this way you deprive him of his best
argument." 45.
Aristotle suggests this in a rather indirect way.

He

speaks of Deople who think that they must at all costs
overthrow the premisses that lie near the conclusion.

He

remarks that these people plead "in excuse for refusing to
grant him some of them (premisses) that he is begging the
original question.n

He adds, nso whenever any one claims to

from ,lls a. point Slloh as is bot1nd to follo·w as a oonseqllenoe
46.

from our thesis •••• we mllst plead the same."
XXIII
Here Schopenhaller makes llse of the trick of empl0ying
contradiction and contention to irritate a man to exaggeratio
then to refllte his exaggerated statement.
"Contradiction and contention irritate a
man into exaggerating his statement. By
contradicting yollr opponent yoll may drive
him into extending beyond its proper limits
a statement which, at all events within those
limits and in itself, is trlle; and when yoll
refute this exa~gerated form of it, you look
as though you had also refuted his original
statement. Contrarily, you must take care
not to allow yourself to be misled by contradiction into exaggerating or extending a
statement of your own. It will often happen
that your opponent will himself directly try
to extend your statement further than you
mean it; here you must at once stop him, and
bring him back to the limits whiah you set
up: "That's what I said, and no more." 47.
This stratagem like number eight and number twentyseven make use of the weakness a man throw himself open
to under strong emotion.

Aristotle speaks of angering your

opponent in the heat of dispute.

He notes that "any mental
48.

discomfiture pllts us off our guard."
connection, however, does not

ex~ressly

Aristotle in this
suggest this as a

means of making one exaggerate his ·statements and then taking
advantage of this exaggeration.
XXIV

This trick is similar to number one.

It consists in

distorting a proposition and then attempting to re!ate the
distortion.
•This trick consists in stating a false
syllogism. Your opponent makes a proposition, and
by false inference and distortion of his ideas
you force from it other propositions which it
does not contain and he does not in the least mean;
nay, which are absurd or dangerous. It then looks
as if his proposition gave rise to others which are
inconsistent either with thenselves or with some
acknowledged truth, and so it appears to be indirectly refuted. This is the diversion, and it
is another application of the fallacy non causae
u.t cau.sae." 49
Aristotle suggests this stratagen when he remarks
that "sometimes the questioner must attack a proposition
different from the thesis." 50.

He also speaks of a

"superflaou.s proposition foisted in as the cause of
an absurd conclusion."

51.

nv
In

number twenty-five Sahopenhauer suggests that

when one's opponent contradiets a u.niversal statement
by an instanae to the

contra~y

one must observe whether

the example is really true and true in the sense stated
and also whether it is inconsistent with this conception.
"This is a ease of the diversion by
means of an ipstance to the aontrary. With
~
a great number of
an induation(ert:L-y-w
partiau.lar instances are required in order
to establish it as a uniyersal pr9position;
but with the diversion (#rr~r~r~ ) a single instance, to which the proposition does
not apply, is all that is neaessary to overthrow it. This is a controversiaL method
known as the instance - instantia, (~vrrA~(~

r"' '

Q

For example. "all ruminants are horned" is a
propos111Dn which may be upset by the single
instance of the camel. The instance is a case
in which a aniversal truth is sought to be applied, and something is inserted in the fundamental definition of it which is not universally true, and by which it is upset. But
there is room for mistake; and when this
trick is employed by your opponent, you must
observe (1) whether the example which he gives
is really true; for there are problems of which
the only true solution is that the case in
point is not true - for example, many miracles,
ghost stories, and so on; and (2) whether it
really comes under the conception of the truth
thus stated; for it may only appear to doso
and the matter is one to be settled by
precise distinctions; and (3) whether it
is really inconsistent with this conception;
for this again may ·be only an ap_parent inconsistency." 52.
·
This seems not to be precisely found in Aristotle.
Of course he speaks of universals as capable of being refuted
by an instance to the contrary.

He observes that "the

universal affirmative is most difficult to establiEh, most
53.

easy to overthrow."

But he evidently does not give the

rules to be observed when employing this trick, as does
Schopenhauer.

XXVI
This stratagem consists in turning the tables and using
the opponent's arrgument ar;ainst himself.
"i\ brilliant move is the retorsio argumenti,
or turning of the tables, by which your
opponent 1 2 argument is turned against himself.
Ee declares, for instance, "So-and-so is a
child, you must make allowance for him."
You retort, "Just because he is a child,
I must correct him otherwise he will persist in his bad habits." 54.
1'

~---------------------------'

The statement of this trick is evidently not to be found
in Aristotle.

XXVII
Here

Schopenhau~r

suggests urging the point at which

one's opponent becomes angry.
nshould your opponent surprize you by
becoming particularly angry at an argument,
you must urge it with all the more zeal; not
only because it is a good thing to make him
angry, but because it may be presumed that you
have here put your finger on the weak side of
his ease, and that just here he is more open to
attack than even for the moment you peraei.ve." 55.
Scho_penhauer has several stratagems that make us of one's.
weakness in times of anger: numbers eight, twenty .. three,
and so forth.

As we have observed, Aristotle suggested the

use of angering one since the "heat of dispute" brings mental
discomfiture and "puts us off guard."

This seems to be the

nearest approach Aristotle has of this particular stratagem.
Apparently he no where suggests urging the point as a sign
of weakness.

XXVIII
This consists in the use of the argument ad auditores.
It takes advantage of the fact that an explanation would
re~uire

too

m~ah

time.

"This is chiefly practicable in a dispute
between scholars in the presence of the unlearned.
If you have no argument ad rem, and none either
ad hominem, you can make on ad auditores; that
is to say, ·you can start some invalid objection,
which, however, only an expert sees to be invalid.
Now your opponent is an expert, but those who form

vUe

audeience are not, and accordingly in their
eyes he is defeated; particularly if the
audience senses that the objection which you
make places him in any ridiculous light.
People are ready to laugh, and you have the
laughers on your side. To show that your
objection is an idle one, would require a
long explanation on the part of your
opponent, and a reference to the principles
of the branch of knowledge in question, or
to the elements of the matter which you are
discussing; and people are not disposed to
listen to it." 56.
Aristotle seems to have this trick in mind when he
writes as follows:

"Just as it is possible to bring a

solution sometirr1es against the argument, at others against
the questioner and his mode of :uestioning, and at others
against neither of these, likewise als0 it is possible to
marshal one's questions and reasoning both against the thesis,
and against the answerer and against the time, whenever the
solution requires a longer time to examine than the period
57.

available."
XXIX:

Here it is suggested that one can save himself by
changing the

subjec~

"If you find that you are being worsted,
you can make a diversion, that is, you can
suddenly begin to talk of something else, as
though it had a bearing on the matter in
dispute, Elnd af'forded an argument against
your opponent. This may be done without
presum~tion if the diversion has, in fact,
some general bearing on the matter; but
it is a piece of impudence if it has nothing
to do with the case, and is only brought in
by way of attacking your opponent.
"The diversion is mere impudence if it
completely abandons the point in dis ute
d

raises for instance, some such objection, as
· "Yes, . and. you alsr:, said just now," and so on.
For then the argument becomes to some extent
personal. Strictly speaking, it is halfway
between the argument~~ ad ~ersonam, and the
argumentum ad hominem." 58.
The exact nature of this stratagem is apparently not
to be found in Aristotle, although he does suggest that one
can avoid confutation by breaking off their argument and
clltting down the line of attack of the enemy.

.And again,

he tells us that "whenever one f'orsees any g_U.estion coming,
one should put in one's objection and have one say beforehand: for by doing so one is likely to embarrass the
59.

Questioner most effectively."

Appealing to authority rather than reason is the
substance of this stratagem.
"This is the argumentum ad vereaundiam.
It consists in making an appeal to authority
rather than reason, and in using such an
authority as may suit the degree of knowledge
possessed by your opponent.
"Every man prefers belief to the exercise
of judgment, says Seneca; and it is therefore
an easy matter if you have an authority on
your side which your opponent respects. The
more limited his capacity and knowledge, the
greater is the number of the authorities
who weigh with him." 60.
Schopenhauer occupies five pages expatiatinp, on this
stratagem.

He notes that ordinary folks have a deep respect

for professional men.

He suggests also that since many

authorities find respect with the mob, one may quote what

these.

au~horities

stances.

said in

~~nether

sense or in other circum-

In speaking of the appeal to a universal prejudioe,

Schopenhauer remarks that, "there is no opinion, however
absurd, which men will not readily embrace. as soon as they
can be brought to the conviction that it is generally adopted
He then illustrates the fact that universality of an opinion
is not proof.
The part of this stratagem of Schopenhauer that suggest
falsifying authority is evidently not in Aristotle.

He does,

however, suggest that "discrepancies should be developed
between the thesis and the tenets either of the answerer or
of those whom he acknowledges to be high authorities, or of
those who are generally so acknowledge, or of those of his ow
school, or of those of the majority of
61.
of all mankind. 11

p~ople,

or of those

XXXI

This suggested stratagem consists in saving one's self
from defeat by declaring oneself to be in incompetent judge.
"If you know that you have no reply to
tp the arguments which your opponent advances,
you may, by a fine stroke of irony, declare
yourself to be an incompetent judge: "Vfuat
you now say passes my poor powers of comprehension; it may be all very true, but I
can't understand it, and I refrain from any
expression of opinion on it." In this way
you insinuate to the bystanders, with whom
you are in good repute, that what your
opponent says is nonseaae. Thus, when
Kant's Kritik appeared, or, rather, when it began
to make a noise in the new world, many professors of the old eclectic school declared
that they failed to understand it, in the

53.

belief that their fanlure settled the business.
But· Vlhen the adherents of the new school proved
.to them that they were quite right, and had
really failed to understand it, they were in
a very bad humour.
"This is a trick which may be used only
when you are quite sure that the audience thinks
much be.tter of you than of your opponent. A
professor, for instance, may try it on a
student •••• It is a particularly malicious
assertion of one~s own authority, instead
of giving reasons." 62.

As far as the writer has been able to discover, Aristototle doesn't have any suggestion of this type of trick.
XXXII
This is a commonly used trick of throwing

suspicion

upon an assertion by classing it with something to which a
stigma is attached.
"If you are confronted with an assertion,
there is a short way of getting rid of it, or,
at any rate, of throwing suspicion on it, by
putting it into some odious category; even
though the connection is only apparent, or
else of a loose character. You can say for
instance, "That is Manichaeism," or "It is
Arianis:1," or "Pelagianism," or "Idealism,"
or "Spinozism," or "Pantheism," or "Brownianism,"
or "Naturalism, n or "A the ism," or "Rationalism,"
"Spritualism," "Mysticism," and so on. In
making an objection of this kind, you take
it for granted (1) that the assertion in
question is identical with, or is at least
contained in, the category cited - that is
to say, you cry out, "Oh, I have heard that
before"; and (2) that the system referred
to has been entirely refuted, and does
not contain a word of truth." 63.
This particular stratagem is not suggested by Aristotle
as far as I was able to discover.

He does, however, speak

of solving.thl9 fallacy from "similarity of expression by
nointing out the difference of category denoted by similar
"'

64.

·words."
XXXIII
This is a sophism that affirms that something may be all
right in theory but not in practice.
"That's all very well in theory, but it won't
do in practice." In this sophism you admit the
premisses but deny the conclusion, in contradiction with a well-known rule of logic. The assertion is based upon an impossibility: what is right
in theory must work in practice; and if it does
not, there-rs-a mistake in theory; something has
been overlooked and not allowed for; and, consequently, what is wrong in practice is wrong
in theory too." 65.
The explicit suggestion of this sophism is apparently
not found in Aristotle.

He, does, of course, suggest the

rule of logic of which this is a contradiction, namely,
"From true premisses it is not possible to draw a false
conclusion, but a true conclusion may be drawn from false
~remisses,

true however, only in respect to fact, not to

66.

reason."
XXXIV

In number thirty-four Schopenhauer suggests the stratagem of urging the point when the opponent avoids the answer
and turns the subject.
"When you state a question or an argument,
and your opponent gives you no direct answer or
reply, ant evades it by a counter-question or
an indirect answer, or some assertion which
has no bearing on the matter, and generally

•.r:z:.

tries to turn the subtject, it is a sure sign that
yo'u have touched a we a~ SIJOt, sometimes without
knowing it. You have, as it were, reduced him
to silence. You must, therefore, furge the
point all the more, and not let your opponent
evade it, even when you do not know where the
weakness which you have hit tlpon really lies." 67.
This is a very self-evident puggestion, but apparently
it was not within the scope of Aristotle's treatise to
suggest it.

mv
This SLlggestion consists in working upon the will
rather than the intellect of one's opponent, or the argumenturn ab utilit.
"There is another trick w•ich, as soon
as it is practicable, makes all others unnecessary. Instead of working on your
opponent's intellect by argument, work
on his will by motive; and he, and also
the audience if they have similar interests,
will at once be won over to your opinion,
even though you got it out of a lunatic
asylum; for, as a general .rule, half an
ounce of will is more effective than a
hundred-weight of insight and intelligence.
This, it is true, oan be done only under
peculiar circumstances. If you succeed
in making your opponent feel that his
opinion, should it prove true, will be
distinctly prejudicial to his interest,
he will let it drop like a hot 9otato,
and feel that it was very imprudentuto
take it up.
"A clergyman, for instance, is defending some philosophical do?~a; you make him
sensible of the fact that it is in immediate
lontradiotion with one of the fundamental
doctrines of his Church, and he abandons
it ••• ··" 68 •.
Sohopenhauer devotes

q1~i

te a bit of space to illustrate

,.

this trick.

Here again the exploit statement of this trick

is not set forth by Aristotle.

There is some similarity,

however, between this and one of the methods Aristotle
sQ~gests

as a means of reducing the opponent to paradox.

"Paradox may be elicited by considering
respondent bel0ngs, and

~roposing

~o

what school the

some tenets of the school
69.

that the world pronounces to be a paradox."
XXXVI
Here Schopenhauer suggests the use of bombast as a
means of bewildering one's opponent.
"You may also puzzle and bewilder your
opponent by mere bombast; and the trick is
possible, because a man generally supposes
that there must be some meaning in words ••
•• If he is secretly conscious of his own
weakness, and accustomed to heart much that
he ~oes not understand, and to make as though
he did, you can easily impose upon him by some
seiious fooling that sounds very deep and
learned, and deprives him of hearing, sight,
and though:b; and by giving out that it is
the most indisputable proof of what you
assert. It is a well-known fact that in
recent times some philosoph&~slhave practiced this trick on the Whole of the public
with the most brilliant success. But since
present examples are odious, we may refer
to The Vicar of Wakefield for an old one." 70.
Neither was the writer able to find this in the writings
of Aristotle.

XXXVII
This trick consists in disproving a faulty proof and
then claiming to have refuted the whole position.
"Should your opponent be in the right, but,

luckily for your contention, choose a
faulty proof, you can easily manage to
refute it, and then claim that you have
thus refuted his whole position. This is
a trick which ought to be one of the first;
it is, at bottom, an expedient by which an
argumentum ad hominem is _put forward as an
argumentum ad rem. If' no accurate proof
occurs to hiL or to the bystanders, you
have won the day. For example, if a
man advances the ontological argument
by way of proving God's existence, you
oan get the best of him, for the ontological argument may easily be refuted.
This is the way in which bad advocates
lose a good case, by trying to justify
it by an authority which does not fit
it, when no fitting one occurs to
them." 71.
Although this is a common stratagem, Aristotle does
not seem to have such a suggestion.
XXVIII
The last stratagem that Schopenhauer suggests is
to defend one's self by attacking the disputant himself.
"A lasttrick is to become personal,
insulting, rude, as soon as you perceive
th?t your opponent has the upper hand, and
that you are going to come off worst.
It consists in passing from the subject
·of dispute, as from a lost game, to the
disputant himself, and in some way attacking his person. It may be called the
argumentum ad personam, to distinguish
it from the argumentum ad hominem,
which passes from the objective discussiop of the subject pure and simple to
the statements or admissions which your
opponent has made in regard to it. But
in hecoming personal you leave the
subject altogether, and turn your attack
to his person, by remarks of an offensive
and spiteful nature. It is an appeal from
the virtues of the intellect to the virtues
of the body, or to mere animalism. This is

a very p~p~la~ _trick, because every one is
able to aarry it into effect; and so it is
of frequent application ••••• " 72.
Schopenhauer expatiates at some length upon this
trick and brings to a close his Art of Controversy by
suggesting some of the advantages of

con~roversy

and some

rules to observe in disputation.
Aristotle apparently makes no suggestion as to the
use of the trick argumentum ad personam.

vo.

CONCLUSION

As we bring this thesis to a close we ·will summarize
and analyze our findings.

In our chapter on their definition

of Dialectic we observed that Aristotle uses the word in a
broader sense than did Schopenhauer who defined it as the
art of gaining one's point.
In the chapter on the basis of all Dialectic we noted
that .Aristotle did not explicitly have a framework to which
every dispute could be reduced; but that there was to be
found in his writings the two basic principles that Schopenhauer set forth, namely, that the two modes of refutation
are to show that a proposition is not in accord with
absolute objective reality or that it is not consistent with
other statements or admissions of one's opponent.
'ffe

observed also that the objects of Schopenhauer and

.Aristotle were radically different, .Aristotle being the much
broader and his treatment of the fallacies more general
than Schopenhauer who merely gives a collection of dishonest
stratagems by which one may be enabled to defend one's self
and frustrate others.
A study of their comparative treatment of the strata-

gems reveals that a large proportion of Schopenhauer's
suggested stratagems are either implicitly or explicitly
found in Aristotle.

It is not an easy matter to determine

which stratagems may be classified as explicitly or implicit

ly in Aristotle, bQt according to my interpretation I have
found that seventeen out of the thirty-eight stratagems of
Schopenhauer may be stated as being explicitly found in the
writings of Aristotle and six may be considered implicit.

1.

It is noteworthy that thirteen of the seventeen stratagems are

t~eated

by Aristotle in the fifteen chapter of

De Sonhisticis Elenohis.

As we have observed, this work is

a treatise on the fallacies and not merely an endeavor to
enumerate dialectical stratagems.

The fifteenth chapter,

however, is given to the discussion of rrthe sources from
which fallacies come," or as Aristotle says,
honesty in puttine, questions."

"fbrms of dis-

It is natural thus

ti

expect

that many of the similarities will be found in this c&hapterr.:.l, ·
We actually find that vJith the exception of one insertion,
Schopenhauer's stratagems follow the identiaal sequenae of
this chapter and in these thirteen stratagems

2.

often the

language is remarkably similar to that of Aristotle.
Sahopenhauerts treatment of these is merely a reproduction and amplification of Aristotle.

ae must, however, in

justice to Schopenhauer, point out that he has a footnote
appended to his statement, "This erotematic or Socratic,
method was especially in use among the ancients; and this and
some of the tricks following later are akin to it,"

3.

which

reads, "They are all free versions of Chapter 15 of Aristotle's
De Sop.hist ic is Elenchis. rr
From this, however, one would not suspect that more than

one-third of Scl10penhaue.r.' s suggested stratagems sould be mere
en enlargement of those found in Aristotle and that they would
follow almost the identical order.

Oaa wonders how Schopen-

hauer could honestly state in the beginning of his work, "I am
not aware that anything has been done in this direction, although I have made inquiries far and wide.

It is therefore an

4.

uncultivated soil."

He refers here, of course, to a

collection of dialectical stratagems.

He even goes so far as

to state in the same connection, "What follovJs is to be regarded as a first attempt."

5.

In the light of the faat that out

of his thirty-eight stratagems, seventeen may be found expliai
ly and six implicitly in Aristotle, it seems strange that
Scho9enhauer should make the above claims.

In other words,

of the thirty-eight stratagems, only fifteen are not traceable
to Aristotle.

Even in many of these there are points of

similarity.
The writer does not want to

~ake

it appear that

Aristotle was the exclusive source of Schopenhauer's The Art
~f--~r~~~'

but it would seem evident that he made greater

use of Aristotle than would appear through the few incidental
references that he makes to him.
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